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Do topological models provide good information about electricity infrastructure vulnerability?
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10.1063/1.3489887
/content/aip/journal/chaos/20/3/10.1063/1.3489887
http://aip.metastore.ingenta.com/content/aip/journal/chaos/20/3/10.1063/1.3489887
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Figures

Image of FIG. 1.
FIG. 1.

An illustration of the difference between a topological (nearest-neighbor) model of cascading failure and one based on Kirchhoff’s laws. (a) Node 2 fails, which means that its power-flow (load) must be redistributed to functioning nodes. (b) In many topological models of cascading failure (e.g., Ref. 9), load from failed components is redistributed to nearest-neighbors (nodes 1 and 3). (c) In an electrical network current reroutes by Kirchhoff’s laws, which in this case means that the power that previously traveled through node 2 is rerouted through nodes 5 and 6. In addition, by Kirchhoff’s laws, node 3 ends up with no power-flow.

Image of FIG. 2.
FIG. 2.

Simulated response of the IEEE 300 bus network to directed attacks. The top panel shows the change in characteristic path lengths as the number of failures increases. The middle panel shows connectivity loss and the bottom panel shows the size of the resulting blackout both as a function of the number of components failed. The results for random failures are averages over 20 trials. The trajectories shown are differences between the attack-vector results and the random failure averages. Shading indicates for the random failures.

Image of FIG. 3.
FIG. 3.

Simulated response of 40 control areas in the Eastern Interconnect network to directed attacks. The top panel shows the average characteristic path lengths as the number of failures increases. The middle panel shows connectivity loss and the bottom panel shows the size of the resulting blackout both as a function of the number of components failed. The results for random failures are averages over 20 trials in each of the 40 areas. The trajectories shown are differences between the attack-vector results (averaged over the 40 areas) and the random failure averages. Shading indicates for the random failures.

Image of FIG. 4.
FIG. 4.

The correlation between blackout sizes and connectivity loss for 40 areas within the EI network. The correlation coefficients corresponding to each attack-vector are as follows: (random failure), (degree attack), (max-traffic attack), (min-traffic attack), (betweenness attack), and (all simulations).

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/content/aip/journal/chaos/20/3/10.1063/1.3489887
2010-09-28
2014-04-21
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752b84549af89a08dbdd7fdb8b9568b5 journal.articlezxybnytfddd
Scitation: Do topological models provide good information about electricity infrastructure vulnerability?
http://aip.metastore.ingenta.com/content/aip/journal/chaos/20/3/10.1063/1.3489887
10.1063/1.3489887
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