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Phys. Rev. A 73, 012344 (2006) [9 pages]

Security of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against individual attacks

Edo Waks
E. L. Ginzton Labs, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA

Hiroki Takesue
NTT Basic Research Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-1 Morinosato Wakamiya, Atsugi, Kanagawa, Japan

Yoshihisa Yamamoto
E. L. Ginzton Labs, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA and National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan
Received 28 October 2005; published 31 January 2006

We derive a proof of security for the differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol under the assumption that Eve is restricted to individual attacks. The security proof is derived by bounding the average collision probability, which leads directly to a bound on Eve's mutual information on the final key. The security proof applies to realistic sources based on pulsed coherent light. We then compare individual attacks to sequential attacks and show that individual attacks are more powerful.

©2006 The American Physical Society

URL: http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.73.012344
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.73.012344
PACS: 03.67.Dd
  • 03.67.Dd
    Quantum cryptography
  • YEAR: 2006
KEYWORDS: quantum cryptography, security, protocols, probability

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